The task presented to the
Advisory Panel
by the Minister and the
Government of Canada was to offer analysis, recommendations and advice
that would ensure
Canada Post’s long-term capacity to achieve and retain
financial self-sustainability and maintain universal postal service in
an evolving postal world that has been made more competitive and
challenging as a result of technological change and globalization.
- Canadians are generally of the opinion that Canada Post is
profitable and financially sound, whereas it is apparent to the
Panel that Canada Post’s financial sustainability is uncertain at
best;
- Canada Post’s plants and facilities are in urgent need of
modernization, as a result of inadequate capital investment;
- There is misunderstanding and misconception at Canada Post and
in the government about Canada Post’s core responsibilities, and the
government’s concrete postal expectations, particularly in the key
areas of the universal service obligation and rural mail services;
- The roles, responsibilities and authority of the government, as
shareholder, the corporation’s Board of Directors, and Canada Post
management need clarification and better mutual understanding; and
- There is an immediate need for postal policy action given these
realities, a situation made more urgent by the recent economic and
financial downturn.
Each of these realities – financial uncertainty, lack of modern
infrastructure, uncertain policy expectations and unclear roles and
responsibilities – combine to limit and threaten
Canada Post’s capacity
to continue to deliver universal postal service of a quality and at a
price that Canadians expect and deserve. The
Advisory Panel
believes
that the formal reporting of
Canada Post’s profitable condition is
accurate but could be misinterpreted. The fact is that the
Canada Post
Group of Companies is marginally profitable at best, while the Canada
Post segment – the post office is barely breaking even.
The Advisory
Panel’s report will seek to address each of these realities in a manner
that respects the four principles set forth by the Minister responsible
for Canada Post in our Terms of Reference:
- Canada Post will not be privatized and will remain a Crown
corporation;
- Canada Post must maintain a universal, effective and
economically viable postal service;
- Canada Post is to continue to act as an instrument of public
policy through the provision of postal services to Canadians; and
- Canada Post is to continue to operate in a commercial
environment and is expected to attain a reasonable rate of return on
equity.
At the heart of the challenging task presented to the Advisory Panel
for this strategic review is the fact that Canada Post is, for all
intents and purposes, a unique institution. There are really no
comparable Canadian institutions for the Advisory Panel
to examine. And,
as will be seen in the following section, there are limits to what can
be learned from other countries.
Canada Post was created in 1981 as a Crown corporation – and this
categorization is particularly apt. The Government of Canada
deliberately and consciously transformed the postal service from a
department of government to a corporate form. Indeed, the history of
Canada Post is, in one sense, the evolution of the Canadian post office
from a departmental, bureaucratic organization into an increasingly
corporate and commercial one. This evolution includes organizational,
corporate, cultural and governance features. This change has been
actively and openly encouraged by successive governments, a pattern
followed in most postal organizations in the industrialized world. It
has made enormous sense, given: the complexity of the postal operation;
the scale of the service provided by Canada Post Corporation (CPC),
which handles literally billions of items a year; the size of its work
force (among the largest in Canada); its character (a highly
capital-intensive infrastructure operation); the nature of its
activities in the transportation and communications markets; and the
fact that it performs and functions in an increasingly commercial and
competitive environment. This is hardly the context for a typical
department/governmental form of organization and operation. Canada Post
Corporation’s corporate structure today is displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Canada Post Corporation

At the same time, Canada Post is a Crown corporation – one that is
100% owned by the Government of Canada. So, while Canada Post is a
corporation, its shareholder is not a typical shareholder. Its
shareholder is the Government of Canada, which has specific public
policy obligations to Canadians to provide a postal service. The
Government of Canada deliberately and consciously retained ownership of
the postal organization, even in the move from a department of
government to a corporate form. This has followed a pattern established
in most postal organizations in the industrialized world, where – with
few exceptions (e.g. partial privatization in The Netherlands and
Germany) – posts remain government owned, even as transportation,
communications, utilities and other state enterprises were privatized.
Indeed, notwithstanding the corporatization and commercialization of the
posts, and notwithstanding the advent of electronic communication
alternatives, postal activity remains a highly sensitive service, and
retains a public policy character for large parts of the population.
This has been the case in New World countries – in particular Canada,
New Zealand, Australia and the United States – where the posts played a
historic nation-building role. And it has also been the case in Canada’s
ancestral nations – England and France – where the post has continued to
retain a highly public character. In this context, one can well
understand why successive governments, here and abroad, have decided to
retain public ownership of the postal service.
Canada Post’s evolution has been, at times, eventful and even awkward,
as there is an inherent tension between commercial and public policy
objectives and underlying values, organization and operation. But
overall, this evolution has followed a relatively purposeful and
coherent path. In simple terms, Canada Post has been encouraged by its
shareholder to develop an increasingly commercial orientation and
financial capacity, and has also been given increased autonomy to allow
it to do so. The government has expected Canada Post to increase its
financial and economic performance (e.g. by setting targets and
requiring the payment of taxes and dividends) and has given it
increasing autonomy and tools to do so (e.g. by increasing its ability
to perform in commercial activities such as the courier business).
However, this increased corporate autonomy has been matched at each
stage by ongoing, albeit different, forms of shareholder (government)
declarations or expectations about service and public policy objectives.
As will be described in this report, this ‘two-step’ march – increased
corporate autonomy matched with enhanced public policy expectations –
culminated in the creation of the 1998 Multi-Year Policy and Financial
Framework for Canada Post. This framework combined financial and social
expectations with some increased corporate and commercial capacity for
Canada Post to meet these expectations. One critical issue for the
Advisory Panel
to address is whether the 1998 Framework remains
appropriate a decade later.
What the Advisory Panel
would like to accomplish is to contribute
positively and constructively to the ongoing evolution of Canada Post.
The Advisory Panel
will propose recommendations and advice with the aim
to ensure that Canada Post has adequate corporate and commercial
capacity to maintain its financial self-sustainability, while presenting
new ways and processes for the shareholder (the government) to
articulate and communicate its public policy expectations of Canada
Post.
The following brief overview of the evolution of CPC will explain and
delineate the ‘two-step’ process that governments have followed –
encouraging and increasing CPC’s autonomy and corporatization, while
making increasingly specific and concrete policy determinations about
CPC’s social obligations and requirements. As noted, the Advisory Panel
will make recommendations that it believes will extend this process in a
positive fashion.
In 1981, the Post Office Department was transformed into Canada Post
Corporation, taking postal operations out of the hands of day-to-day
government and placing them in a corporate organization as a Crown
corporation financially independent of government. This initiative was
widely supported in Canada as a way of making the postal operation more
efficient, more effective and less costly to government, given the high
deficits incurred by the Post Office throughout the 1970s.
Bill C-42 directed Canada Post to provide a basic and customary service,
the universal service obligation (USO), although this was not
well-defined. Bill C-42 also directed Canada Post to “conduct its
operations on a self-sustaining financial basis, while providing a
standard of service that will meet the needs of the people of Canada and
that is similar with respect to communities of the same size.”
This economic versus social juggling act saw corporate autonomy (an
11-person independent Board, including the Chair and the CEO, which
would devise corporate strategies and plans) contend with continuing
high levels of direct government control (Governor in Council
appointment of the Board and the CEO, and a minister with directive
power and authority over borrowing and debt, property and prices, and
regulations and corporate plans). Despite a substantial increase in
postal rates in 1981 (from 17 to 30 cents), postal deficits totalled
$1.3 billion between the 1982 and 1985 fiscal years, suggesting that
this balance was not successful.
The previous process concluded with the federal government rejecting
CPC’s 1984 corporate plan as unrealistic and not moving Canada Post
toward corporate and financial viability. The government created a panel
– similar to the present Advisory Panel
and composed primarily of
private sector people – to review CPC’s mandate. The Marchment Report
proposed a bold and aggressive strategy of commercializing Canada Post –
from cost-cutting and rationalization measures, which would diminish or
limit postal services, to balancing the books and strengthening the
Board of Directors.
The government accepted the recommendations and moved them along by
appointing a new corporate leader (CEO) and an exclusively
business-oriented Board. It also made its policy intentions clear in the
1986 Corporate Plan, a document as important as Bill C-42, which the
government itself prepared. Canada Post was instructed to balance its
budget by 1987-88, to create a surplus by 1989, and to generate $300
million in dividends and a 14-15% return on equity by 1994. This
instruction was extended when Canada Post was scheduled under the
Financial Administration Act (FAA) as a Schedule III (2) Crown operation
functioning in a competitive market environment.
Canada Post began making profits in fiscal year 1988-89. Delivery
standards were also set (two days locally, three days regionally, four
days nationally). Once the government made its policy objectives clear,
Canada Post was given the corporate autonomy to realize the financial
objectives set by the government. This autonomy was used, among other
things, to extend the use of community mailboxes (limiting home delivery); to
contract out sorting and delivery of parcels; to close or transform 30%
of the rural network; to franchise urban post offices; to increase
postal mechanization and reduce full-time employment by 10 000; to move
to market-based pricing of its competitive products; to limit financial
support to public postal services like publications mail; and to
purchase Purolator in order to enter the courier market.
The previous period saw the government communicate its objectives to
Canada Post and assign Canada Post requisite corporate autonomy to
attain those (mainly) financial objectives. The effect was to neutralize
the need for the corporation to pay attention to the social side of the
postal juggling act.
A new government in 1993 acted to re-balance the economic and social
goals of CPC, albeit without reducing the corporatization
accomplishments of the previous six years. For example, it almost
immediately introduced a 30-day moratorium on rural postal closings.
This moratorium was extended in 1994 indefinitely. The new government
also disallowed a price increase. (An increase was later approved, but a
price freeze was later imposed until 2000.) The government further
corporatized the CPC environment by making it a prescribed Crown
corporation under the Income Tax Act. This required Canada Post to pay
income taxes, like any private sector company. This pattern of balancing
commercialization with social controls was extended after the conclusion
of another mandate review (the Radwanski Report) in 1995-96. On the one
hand, the government extended the moratorium on rural closings and
increased service standards. On the other hand, the government made
clear that CPC could remain active in competitive and commercial areas
(beyond the narrow confines of lettermail) and could retain ownership of
Purolator. Moreover, the government did not require CPC to undo the
corporatization accomplishments of earlier years, such as postal
closings, franchising and rationalization.
This process culminated in 1998, when the government created the
Multi-Year Policy and Financial Framework (see Appendix B, page 119).
The Framework, through a series of quantitative targets, articulated the
government’s expectations for financial return and for some service
elements as well as establishing a price cap formula for the basic
lettermail rate. At the same time, it also confirmed CPC’s ability to
compete in the wider competitive environment. Generally, the idea was
that once the Framework was in place, CPC would have the autonomy to
pursue its commercial agenda within the parameters of the Framework.
Moreover, the fact that the Framework was announced quietly and without
public fanfare gave CPC some degree of protection and increased its
autonomy. The Advisory Panel will analyze and comment on the Framework
in Part II of this report and make some recommendations in Part III
about a framework appropriate for Canada Post’s future.
The two-step pattern of increasing corporatization matched with
government issued objectives continues to the present.
On the one hand, in 2007 the government introduced Bill C-14 to
deregulate outgoing international mail, which would have intensified
Canada Post’s competitive environment. The Bill died on the order paper
when Parliament was dissolved in
September 2008.
On the other hand, in 2006, the government used its directive power to
set out and clarify to CPC its policy objectives in two areas. First, in
the context of addressing concerns about safety issues associated with
the delivery of rural mail, the government directed Canada Post to
continue to deliver mail at individual rural roadside mailboxes and to
draw up an operational plan to address this issue. Second, the
government directed Canada Post to continue to provide financial support
to the Publications Assistance Program, until March 31, 2009.
The strategic review process offers the possibility of creating the next
stage in the evolution of Canada Post, as it confronts new market
conditions, globalization and technological change. The objective of the
strategic review is to improve Canada Post’s capacity through
appropriate tools and policies – to allow it to confront these new
conditions – while also devising new ways for the shareholder (the
government) to articulate and communicate its financial and social goals and expectations about the postal system to Canada Post.
This report will be presented in three parts. Part I is made up of
what the Panel learned through its consultations with, and submissions
from, Canadians. Part II presents the Panel’s analysis of the major
themes and issues that envelop the postal world and Canada Post’s place
in it. Part III will present the Advisory Panel’s recommendations to the
Minister, based on what we have learned.
In Part I, the report will:
- Analyze broadly what is happening in the postal market;
- Present and explain what Canadians have told us (individual postal
users, small and large customers, competitors, social groups, unions and
so on);
- Present and analyze the major trends among a number of posts
abroad; and
- Present what we learned from Canada Post, both with respect to
its analysis of the conditions it faces and with regard to what it
perceives it needs in order to attain the financial
self-sustainability that is required if it is to pursue the
universal service obligation and meet Canadians’ postal needs.
In Part II, the report will present and analyze our understanding of the five
major themes and issues that envelop the postal world and Canada Post’s place in
it:
- The need to establish a clear and transparent understanding of
the universal service obligation, which lies at the heart of Canada
Post’s existence;
- The urgent need for Canada Post to modernize its network and to keep
it current and up-to-date
on an ongoing basis;
- The tools that Canada Post needs to become financially
self-sustaining;
- The need to create a clear and transparent understanding of Canada
Post’s roles and responsibilities in rural Canada; and
- The need to clarify, make transparent and operationalize the
respective roles, responsibilities, and authority of the Government of
Canada, Canada Post’s Board of Directors and the corporation’s
management.
The analysis presented in Part II will lay the foundation for the
presentation and explanation in Part III of the Advisory Panel’s
recommendations, including a Revised Financial and Service Framework for
Canada Post. This Framework and these recommendations are aimed at
devising a new and improved way for the government to clarify,
articulate and communicate its objectives to CPC, while establishing an
appropriate degree of corporate autonomy and capacity for Canada Post so
that it has the tools to successfully address new and rapidly changing
market conditions.
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